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VietnamThis paper uses household panel data from rural Vietnam to explore the effects of having a relative in a position of
political or bureaucratic power. Our results suggest that households increase their investment in land improve-
ments due to such ties. Likely explanations are that connections to ofﬁce holders strengthen de facto land prop-
erty rights and access to both credit and transfers. Results also indicate that ofﬁcials prefer to use informal rather
than formal channels of redistribution to relatives.
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction1
This paper investigates the potential effect of family ties between
farmers and local government ofﬁcials on investment in agricultural
land improvements. The importance of agricultural investment for eco-
nomic development is well recognized and has received increased at-
tention in recent years, in part as a result of the ‘food price crises’ in
2007–08 (e.g. de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2008). A number of papers have
investigated the effects of land property rights, credit, insurance, infra-
structure and other factors on agricultural investment (e.g. Alston
et al., 1996, Besley, 1995, Binswanger et al., 1993, Braselle et al., 2002,
Carter and Olinto 2003, Do and Iyer 2008, Eswaran and Kotwal 1987,
Feder and Onchan 1987, Hornbeck 2010, Jacoby et al., 2002, Jacoby
and Mansuri 2008, Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993). The literature on
the political economy of local government in developing countries is
also growing fast (e.g. Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000, 2006, Besley
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ights reserved.At the same time, few studies have brought the above two strands of
literature together by studying the political economy of agricultural in-
vestment. An important exception is the contribution by Goldstein and
Udry (2008). They investigated the effect of position in traditional, local
power hierarchies on fallowing of agricultural land in the Akwapim re-
gion of Ghana. Fallow is a major type of investment and Goldstein and
Udry show that farmers with traditional political ofﬁce have stronger
property rights than other farmers. They therefore fallow their land
much longer than others. We aim to contribute to these insights and
do so in a very different context, namely that of rural Vietnam.2
Households may be connected with public ofﬁcials in three different,
but not mutually exclusive ways. First, one or more household members
may themselves be public ofﬁcials. Second, a household may have rela-
tives living outside the household who are public ofﬁcials. Third, friends
or other non-family relations of the household may be ofﬁcials. Our data
set contains information on the presence of public ofﬁcials in each house-
hold and on whether household members have relatives or personal
friends who are ofﬁcials. For methodological reasons, we focus on the ef-
fects of having relatives outside the householdwho are ofﬁcials. Thismeans
that wemainly investigate government capture by the extended families
of public ofﬁcials. In other words, we study nepotism in local government.
The reason for focusing on connections with relatives (rather than
looking at the effects of ofﬁcials in the household or connections with
non-relatives) is potential endogeneity. Whether a household member
takes up work as a public ofﬁcial, and whether the household forms2 Our analysis is also related to a group of papers addressing the economic effects of po-
litical connections (e.g. Fisman, 2001, Khwaja andMian, 2005) and to the literature inves-
tigating personal connections between managers and workers within organizations (e.g.
Bandiera et al., 2009; Prendergast and Topel, 1996).
3 As described in Pingali and Xuan (1992), steps were taken in this direction as early as
1981.
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neously determined with our main outcome variable, agricultural in-
vestment. To illustrate, if a household has invested heavily in the
introduction of a new, high-value crop, the incentives for household
members to seek employment as ofﬁcials may be lower than those in
other households. The returns from spending time on the farm are
higher. A household planning to investmay actively nurture relationships
with non-relatives in government in order to obtain approval or assis-
tance for the investment project. Also, households may report an ofﬁcial
as a ‘friend’ exactly because he or she assisted the household with a pro-
ject, rather than the otherway around. Connectionswith relatives outside
the household are arguably more exogenous. A household's investment
decisions do little to affect the probability of relatives in other households
taking up positions as ofﬁcials. Clearly, unobserved family characteristics
(entrepreneurial spirit, risk and time preferences, etc.) may affect invest-
ment as well as the probability of having a relative in the local govern-
ment. These factors are taken into account through the introduction of
household ﬁxed effects in our regressions.
The economic importance of family networks in Vietnam is docu-
mented by the survey data used here, as well as by other sources. For ex-
ample, for more than half of the plots rented out by households in our
survey, the tenants are relatives of the landlord. More than 90% of mone-
tary transfers received by households from private sources are from rela-
tives, andmore than70% report relatives as themain source of emergency
funding. The 2001 World Values Survey in Vietnam asked respondents
about the importance of different ‘life domains’. Some 82% of respondents
say that the family is ‘very important’. Some 57% regard ‘work’ as being in
the same category, while only 22% rank ‘friends’ as very important
(Dalton et al., 2002). A key part of the background for theseﬁndings is un-
doubtedly the enduring inﬂuence of Confucianism in Vietnamese society.
So, family ties are important, but are ties to relatives with public of-
ﬁces particularly important and do they matter for agricultural invest-
ment? There are several reasons to expect that ties to government
ofﬁcials should matter for investment in land improvements. First, the
attractiveness of such investment depends on the security of land prop-
erty rights. Local government often plays a critical role in determining
the strength of land rights. Local ofﬁcials issue property deeds, decide
on land expropriation for infrastructure and other development pro-
jects, and implement land use regulation such as ‘zoning’ laws. Second,
investment needs to be ﬁnanced, and in areaswhere commercial, ﬁnan-
cial institutions are not well developed, local government often plays a
key role in regulating access to credit. Third, agricultural investment is
risky, even when land property rights are secure. New crops may fail
or the price of output may drop. Investment is particularly risky when
land markets are poorly developed because recovery of investment
through sale or rental is prevented. Local governments often control im-
portant sources of insurance. Access to credit is one such source, others
include access to public sector employment and government transfers.
A priori, it is not clear whether discrimination in favor of relatives
leads to efﬁciency losses. This depends on the motivation of ofﬁcials.
One possibility is that favoritism is driven by a ‘taste for discrimination’,
in the words of Gary Becker (1971). In this case, the ofﬁcial attaches
higher weight to the welfare of relatives than to others in his or her
maximization problem. This type of behavior, which might be labeled
‘true nepotism’, generates inefﬁciencies relative to the goal of maximiz-
ing a welfare function that weighs everybody equally. Another possibil-
ity is that ofﬁcials are constrained in their access to information and
ability to enforce contracts. For example, administrators of a public
lending scheme may not be perfectly informed about the ability and
willingness of potential borrowers to repay loans. In this situation, ofﬁ-
cials may rely on family networks as a form of social capital. Ofﬁcials
may be better informed about the skills and honesty of relatives than
those of other people. They may also rely on informal ties for enforce-
ment of contracts. In this case, targeting public resources to relatives
of ofﬁcials might be efﬁcient, helping the ofﬁcial solve an agency
problem.We use household-level panel data from the rural areas of 12 prov-
inces in Vietnam. A bit more than 2000 households were surveyed
three times over a period of four years during 2008–12, and it appears
from our analysis that households with connections increase their in-
vestment in land improvement. We investigate three potential channels
through which political/bureaucratic connections may affect invest-
ment: property rights, and access to respectively credit and transfers.
The results suggest that connections decrease the probability of being ex-
pelled from land by the state, and have positive effects on access to infor-
mal credit and to both public and private transfers. Another interesting
feature of our ﬁndings is that ofﬁcials tend to prefer informal over formal
channels of redistribution to relatives. Connections with public ofﬁcials
have no effect on the probability of holding a land title (a formal
means of property rights protection) but do affect the probability of hav-
ing land conﬁscated by the state. Although effects of connections on pub-
lic transfers are of the same magnitude as effects on private transfers,
connections have a much stronger effect on access to informal than to
formal credit. Informal channels of redistribution are more difﬁcult to
monitor for those who may hold ofﬁcials accountable for their conduct
(local populations as well as higher levels of government) than formal
channels. A preference for using informal channels of redistribution indi-
cates in our assessment that ofﬁcials seek to hide these transactions from
their principals. This supports the view that favoritism is driven by a taste
for discrimination, rather than by concerns for efﬁciency.
These ﬁndings stress the signiﬁcance of informal networks for eco-
nomic behavior in developing economies. They also suggest the pres-
ence of a potential for faster economic development. If households
without political or bureaucratic connections could obtain equally
strong property rights and access to ﬁnance and insurance as the well-
connected households, agricultural investment would increase. As a re-
sult, rural economic growth would be stimulated.
Section 2 provides background information on land and local gov-
ernment in Vietnam. Section 3 presents the data and deﬁnes key vari-
ables. Section 4 contains descriptive statistics, and Section 5
investigates whether households gain new connections through
marriage or because relatives move into new positions as ofﬁcials.
Section 6 includes the core analysis of connections to ofﬁcials
and land-related investment. Section 7 studies the effects of political/
bureaucratic connections on land property rights, while Section 8 anal-
yses the effects of access to credit, and Section 9 focuses on the relation-
ship between connections and access to transfers. Section 10 concludes.2. Background
Vietnamese agriculture is dominated by small, owner-operated
farms. Rentals account for only about ﬁve percent of agricultural land
in our sample, and collective farms play a very minor role. The back-
ground for this pattern is the 1987 and 1993 land laws, which followed
the Doi Moi reform program initiated at the 1986 Communist Party
Congress. The 1987 land law, implemented in 1988 through a directive
known as Resolution 10, transferred farming responsibilities from agri-
cultural collectives to households.3 The 1993 land law went a step fur-
ther and introduced Land Use Right Certiﬁcates (LURCs), also known
as Red Books. They entitled holders to 20 years of user rights for annual
cropland and 50 years for perennial crop land. LURCs may be traded,
rented, mortgaged, exchanged, and bequeathed. For practical purposes,
LURCs are therefore quite similar to proper land titles.
Ravallion and van de Walle (2004, 2006, 2008a) show that (i) the
process of de-collectivization in the late 1980s and early 1990s was
largely equitable and efﬁcient, (ii) subsequent land transactionsworked
to decrease the inefﬁciencies that arose from administrative land alloca-
tion, and (iii) recent increases in landlessness should be interpreted as a
5 See CIEM et al. (2009) for further background information and details. The sampled
provinces are, by region: Red River Delta: Ha Tay; North East: Lao Cai, Phu Tho; North
West: Lai Chau, Dien Bien; North Central Coast: Nghe Anh; South Central Coast: Quang
Nam, Khanh Hoa; Central Highlands: Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Lam Dong; and Mekong River
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groups being marginalized. Do and Iyer (2008) argue that the issuance
of LURCs in the 1990s stimulated investment in perennial crops and in-
creased time allocated to off-farm employment. Deininger and Jin
(2008) show that land markets in Vietnam, especially rental markets,
function to allocate land to efﬁcient small-scale farmers.
We do not dispute these ﬁndings. At the same time, it is important to
note that landmarkets, especially sales markets, remain extremely thin
inmany regions of Vietnam, particularly in the north. Formore than 70%
of the plots in our sample, farmers declared themselves unable to esti-
mate the sales value of the land and less than 15% of the plots have
been acquired through purchase. Thin or non-existing land markets
render land-related investment more risky than otherwise because op-
portunities to recover investments through sale are reduced.4
Vietnamhas three tiers of local government, at province, district and
commune levels. At each level, the local government is headed by
‘People’s Committees’ (PCs). Some members of the PCs are appointed
by higher levels of government, while others are chosen in local elec-
tions. Although non-party members are sometimes allowed to run
and win elections, the election process is tightly managed by the Com-
munist Party and the ‘Fatherland Front’, an umbrella organization close-
ly linked with the Party. No other parties than the Communist is
allowed. At each level, another elected body, the People's Council, un-
dertakes an oversight function vis-à-vis the People's Committee. Local
government leaders in Vietnam have generally been more accountable
toward higher levels of government than toward local populations.
However, downward accountability has been strengthened in recent
years through the adoption of the so-called ‘Ordinance on Grassroots
Democracy’ (OGD), passed in 1998 and strengthened in 2003 and
2007. The OGD spells out the rights of citizens in different areas, in
terms of access to information, consultation and decision-making.
Local government in Vietnam impacts heavily on all areas of rural eco-
nomic life. First, local governments play a crucial role in determining
property rights security. Most obviously, the state manages the issuance
of LURCs. While the process of issuing LURCs to millions of land users
progressed with impressive speed and, as noted above, without obvious
signs of widespread abuse by local authorities in the 1990s, current man-
agement of LURC issuance iswidely perceived to behighly affectedby cor-
ruption (World Bank, 2009, Fig. 3.5). Second, land expropriation by the
state is quite common (four percent of households in our sample experi-
enced at least one expropriation in the past two years). This is to be ex-
pected in an environment of rapid, economic development, where land
needs to be taken into use for infrastructure and industry, but the terms
of expropriation are contentious (Anderson and Davidsen, 2011, World
Bank, 2009, chap. 3). Also, the State intervenes heavily in farmer decisions
on land use. For example, local land-use plans often designate plots to be
plantedwith speciﬁc crops,most commonly rice (Markussen et al., 2011).
Second, almost all formal lending institutions operating in rural
areas of Vietnam are controlled by the state. In particular, commune au-
thorities are widely used to screen applicants for loans from the most
important state banks. These include the Vietnam Social Policy Bank
(VSPB), which extends non-collateralized loans to poorer families, and
the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD),
which lends to rural households with security in LURCs. Third, local of-
ﬁcials control access to a number of public transfer programs targeted to
the poor, the sick, the elderly and others. These transfersmay be used to
ﬁnance investment and also function to cushion households from the
negative impact of investments that fail.
Some direct evidence on the importance of informal connections be-
tween government ofﬁcials and private agents in Vietnam is provided by
Appold and Phong (2001). They describe the functioning of such net-
works between government bureaucrats and ﬁrm managers. Gillespie
(2002) argues that ‘personalism’, as opposed to merit-based systems of4 For general treatments of land issues in Vietnam, see Kerkvliet (2006), Brandt (2006),
Ravallion and van de Walle (2008b), Kirk and Nguyen (2009) and Luu et al. (2013).recruitment and promotion, is the key mode of operation in the
Vietnamese party and government hierarchies. Similarly, Gainsborough
(2007) makes the case that patronage distribution plays a central role
in the functioning of the Communist Party. Nguyen et al. (2012) show
that towns where local ofﬁcials are promoted to higher ranks of govern-
ment experience faster improvement in local infrastructure than other
towns. The entrenched nature of political patronage in Vietnam is also
discussed in Abrami et al. (2008).
3. Dataset, estimation model, and identiﬁcation strategy
Our three-wave household panel dataset was collected in the
Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS). The VARHS
was implemented in 12 provinces in Vietnam between July and
September 2008, June and August 2010, and June and August 2012. It
re-interviewed rural households sampled for the income and expendi-
ture modules of the 2002 and 2004 Vietnam Household Living Stan-
dards Survey (VHLSS) in the 12 provinces.5 Provinces were selected to
facilitate the use of the survey as an evaluation tool for Danida-
supported programs in Vietnam. Seven of the 12 provinces are covered
by the Danida business sector program support (BSPS), and ﬁve
provinces are covered by the agricultural and rural development
(ARD) program. The provinces supported by the agricultural support
program are located in the north-west and central highlands, so these
relatively poor and sparsely populated regions are over-sampled.6
The 2008 round of the VARHS survey covered 2,278 households. A
total of 2,233 were identiﬁed and resurveyed in 2010 and 2,148 again
in 2012 (implying an average attrition rate of three percent). The house-
hold survey collected detailed information on connections to ofﬁcials,
other types of social capital, land-related investment, land characteris-
tics, agricultural inputs and outputs, household income, saving and bor-
rowing, and general information about individuals and households.
The primary hypothesis studied here is whether family connections
with public ofﬁcials lead to increased levels of land-related investment,
and we consider regressions of the type:
Iht ¼ αCht þ β′Xht þ vh þ εht ð1Þ
where Iht is the real value of land-related investment undertaken by
household h in period t, Cht is an indicator for having a personal connec-
tion to a local government ofﬁcial, and Xht is a vector of potentially time-
varying household characteristics. vh represents unobserved, ﬁxed
household characteristics. The error term εht captures measurement
error in the value of investment and unobserved, time-varying house-
hold characteristics. Conditional on Xht and vh, εht is assumed to be un-
correlated with Cht.
There are threemain elements in the identiﬁcation strategy. First, as
pointed out in Section 1, focusing on connections with relatives outside
the household, rather than ofﬁcials in the household or connections
with friends, reduces concerns about simultaneity between investment
and connections. Accordingly, Cht is a measure of having a relative out-
side the household in government.
Second, household ﬁxed effects remove the confounding effects of
time-invariant unobservables, such as entrepreneurship, cognitive abil-
ities and risk preferences.
Third, a set of control variables account for time-varying factors that
may affect both connections and investment. Arguably, this is a poten-
tially vulnerable element in the identiﬁcation strategy. While a numberDelta: Long An.
6 The VARHSwas also implemented in 2002 and 2006, but several key variables used in
this study were only introduced in 2008. Our sample is statistically representative at the
provincial but not at the national level.
7 As argued in Ashenfelter et al. (1986, appendix), randommeasurement error tends to
lead to upward bias in estimates of change rates (even when estimates of levels are unbi-
ased), especially when the true rate of change is low. Therefore, 25% should be considered
an upper bound on the true rate of change in connections status.
8 Although the current fertility rate in Vietnam is below two children per woman
(somewhat higher in rural areas), fertility was around ﬁve in 1982 and around seven in
1972 (Source: World Development Indicators). Therefore, current household heads and
their spouses are likely to have four to six siblings each and a large number of cousins.
294 T. Markussen, F. Tarp / Journal of Development Economics 110 (2014) 291–302of important, time-varying factors are controlled in the regressions,
causal inference relies on the assumption that unobserved shocks to
the households' non-political connections, to the wealth or human cap-
ital of the households' relatives, or other unobserved, time-varying fac-
tors do not affect both connections to relatives in government and
investment. For example, a daughter of the household may return
from a stay in the city with savings and new knowledge about invest-
ment projects, and she might marry a government ofﬁcial and move to
his house. The inﬂuence of such events is only partly controlled for
(we control for recent marriages in the household and presence of a rel-
ative who can assist withmoney in case of an emergency). The use of an
instrumental variable, thought to be uncorrelated with unobservables,
would in principle further strengthen the causal interpretation of re-
gressions, but such a variable is not available. Nevertheless, the focus
on connections with relatives, inclusion of household ﬁxed effects and
the introduction of control variables should help deal with potential
endogeneity.
Also, the analyses of connections and investment are followed by
analyses of the effects of connections on plausible determinants of in-
vestment, namely property rights, and access to credit and to transfers.
Some of the unobservables, which may be correlated with investment,
are unlikely to be correlated with property rights, credit and transfers.
We ﬁnd that family connections to ofﬁcials positively affect these vari-
ables, which help strengthen the case for a causal link between connec-
tions and investment. For example, while the returning daughter in the
example above may affect investment, by providing funds and knowl-
edge, she is unlikely to affect the household's risk of government land
expropriation or access to public loans or transfers, except through
her husband, the government ofﬁcial.
To test the hypotheses of effects from connections to property rights,
and to credit and transfers, we replace Iht in equation (1) withmeasures
of property rights and access to respectively credit and transfers.
We have data on four different types of land-related investment, in-
cluding investments in soil and water conservation, perennial crops,
structures for aquaculture (mainly ponds) and other structures, such
as farm buildings, fences and animal sheds. For each type of investment,
data was collected on cash spending as well as household labor input
during the past year. Household labor is valued by the average wage
rate in the province for an unskilled, agricultural laborer, calculated
from the wage and employment data available in the survey. The total
value of investment is calculated as the sum of cash spending and the
value of labor inputs in all four types of investment.
Tomeasure personal connections to ofﬁcials, respondents were asked
whether any of their (i) relatives or (ii) personal friends outside the
household ‘hold any ofﬁce or other trusted positions in the commune or
higher levels of government’. At most two connections could be listed.
The survey also asks whether ofﬁcials are residing in the household.
This is the case for about 5% of households. To avoid mixing the effect of
connections to ofﬁcials with the effect of being an ofﬁcial, and because
the decision towork as an ofﬁcial is potentially endogenous, these house-
holds are excluded from the analyses. The main results are unchanged
when households with ofﬁcials are included in the estimation sample.
4. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on connections to ofﬁcials, land-
related investment and a number of other household characteristics in
the initial survey year, 2008. Results are presented for four categories of
households: (i) those that did not have a relative in government in either
2008 or 2012 ('never connected'); (ii) those with such a connection in
both years ('always connected'); (iii) those with a connection in 2012
but not in 2008 ('gained a connection'); and (iv) those with a connection
in 2008 but not in 2012 ('lost a connection'). Results for the full sample of
households available in both 2008 and 2012 are also shown. The table
shows that 21% of households have a relative who is an ofﬁcial, while
only 10% have personal friends in trusted government positions.A total of 46% of households undertook some formof land-related in-
vestment in the past year. The most common form of investment is in
soil andwater conservation. Given the prevalence of paddy rice farming
in Vietnam, this is not surprising. Themost valuable type of investment,
on the other hand, is in ‘structures’, such as fences and farm buildings.
The average value of land-related investment is 2.1 million dong,
which is equivalent to about ﬁve percent of average, annual household
income. Households with family connections to ofﬁcials in both 2008
and 2012 invest more than households that are never connected in all
categories, although the difference is only statistically signiﬁcant
for total investment and in two of four sub-categories. However, the
well-connected also stand out when it comes to other variables. For ex-
ample, they have more schooling, are members of more voluntary-
membership groups and are less likely to be female-headed. As already
noted, we investigate in this paper whether the correlation between
connections and investment is robust when these other factors are con-
trolled for.
Since most of the regressions reported in what follows include
household ﬁxed effects, estimation of the effects of connections relies
on the subset of households that either gain or lose a relative with a
public ofﬁce during the period of the survey. About 25% of households
belong to this category.7 Table 1 shows that while households that
gained or lost a connection, respectively, are about equally likely to un-
dertake any investment, householdswho lost a connection (i.e.whohad
one in 2008) had substantially higher values of investment in 2008 than
households who gained a connection (i.e. did not have one in 2008).
This suggests that current connection status is a determinant of invest-
ment, although the difference between the two groups is not statistical-
ly signiﬁcantwhen only 2008 data is used. Tables presented in Section 6
explore whether this changes when data from all survey rounds is
exploited.
5. Source of connections
This section investigates the drivers of intra-household changes in
connections to relatives in government. Households may gain or lose a
connection to a relative with a public ofﬁce for two types of reasons.
First, a relative may be appointed as an ofﬁcial, or leave such a position.
Second, the household may gain a new relative with a public ofﬁce
through marriage, or lose one through divorce. When a household
gains a connection through marriage, we can distinguish between two
different cases.
a. A household member, for example a daughter of the household
head, may marry an ofﬁcial and move out of the household.
b. A relative outside the household may marry an ofﬁcial.
In case a, it is relevant to consider that the marriage may affect in-
vestment and other outcomes in other ways than simply through the
gain of a well-placed connection. For example, household labor supply
may go down, and this may in turn effect investment positively or neg-
atively. These issues are of much less concern if a relative outside the
household gets married (case b). Since the typical family has many
more relatives outside thehousehold, we expect that it ismore common
that a connection through marriage is gained outside than inside the
household. This is so even if the strength (quality) of the connection
may be stronger if it is formed through the marriage of a household
member.8 We do not have direct evidence on the sources of family
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for initial year (means).
Never connected Always connected Gained connection Lost connection All
Connections to ofﬁcials
Relative with public ofﬁce 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.21
Friend with public ofﬁce 0.06 0.221*** 0.05 0.25*** 0.10
Land-related investment
Invested in land improvement 0.43 0.57*** 0.55** 0.54*** 0.46
Invested in soil and water cons 0.33 0.44** 0.46** 0.44*** 0.37
Invested in perennial crops 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.13
Invested in aquaculture 0.06 0.13* 0.10 0.10 0.08
Invested in other structures 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.08
Total investment in land improvement 1869 3900 1767 2612 2089
Investment in soil and water cons. 595 2,033 889 586 699
Investment in perennial crops 306 460 221 365 317
Investment in aquaculture 232 662 253 663* 323
Investment in other structures 736 744 404 998 749
Other variables
Household income 34,993 52,966** 47,465*** 48,154* 39,023
Number of groups the hh belongs to 1.48 1.76** 1.47 1.65* 1.52
Number of weddings attended 15.59 20.73*** 18.64* 18.82** 16.62
Relatives who can offer ﬁnancial aid 0.65 0.74* 0.59 0.73** 0.66
Hosted wedding in last year 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07
Household size 4.63 4.26** 4.59 4.61 4.61
Operated farm land, sqm. 8567 7150 7193 8028 8294
Share of land irrigated 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.67 0.65
Share of land with perennial crops 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.28
Age of household head 51.09 53.15 50.04 52.38 51.32
Years of schooling of household head 6.02 7.24*** 6.43 6.53** 6.20
Female household head 0.20 0.11*** 0.16 0.22 0.19
Share of land with LURC 0.74 0.79 0.67* 0.81** 0.75
Share of land rented 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08
Expelled from land by state in last two years 0.03 0.09* 0.03 0.04 0.04
Has formal loan 0.35 0.36 0.31 0.38 0.36
Has informal loan 0.15 0.17 0.08*** 0.16 0.15
Receives public transfers 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.37 0.41
Receives private transfers 0.34 0.45** 0.28 0.34 0.34
Number of households 1358 159 269 240 2,026
Data for 2008, for households available in both 2008 and 2012. Only households who own or operate agricultural land are included. Households with public ofﬁcials are excluded. 'Never
connected' means that the household did not have a relative with public ofﬁce in either 2008 or 2012. 'Always connected' means that it had such a relative in both years, and so on. On the
value of investment variables, three extremely high outliers are excluded (two of them have relatives with public ofﬁces). Money values are in '000 Vietnamese dong. Prices are adjusted
for regional price variation, using 2008prices in the RedRiver Delta as the basis. Stars indicatewhether difference from 'never connected' households is statistically signiﬁcant or not (stan-
dard errors clustered by commune). *Signiﬁcant at 10%; **signiﬁcant at 5%; ***signiﬁcant at 1%.
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awedding in the last year, and on howmanyweddings they attended in
other households.
Table 2 explores whether these two variables affect the probability
that a household gained a connection to a relative, who is an ofﬁcial,
between two survey rounds. The table presents conditional logit regres-
sions with household ﬁxed effects. The dependent variable is a dummy
for gaining a connection since the previous round of the survey. The
main explanatory variables are, ﬁrst, a dummy for hosting a wedding
in the household, and second, two alternative measures of the number
of weddings attended outside the household. The frequency of wedding
attendance is much higher than that which is typical in Western coun-
tries. Only about two percent of households did not attend at least one
wedding in the past 12 months before the survey. The median of the
variable is 15 and the mean is 17. We include either a dummy for at-
tending at least 15 weddings, or ln(Number of weddings attended
+ 1). The logarithmic speciﬁcation is attractive because the distribution
of the variable is quite strongly skewed (30 households report attending
100 weddings or more). In addition, models 3 and 4 include a set of
basic household characteristics that may conceivably be correlated
with both wedding attendance and connections status. All regressions
include year ﬁxed effects.
The results in Table 2 show a strong and signiﬁcant effect of the
number of weddings attended in other households on the probability
of gaining a connection. On the other hand, there is no signiﬁcant effect
of hosting a wedding or of any of the controls. A causal effect of wed-
dings on connections cannot be inferred with certainty. First, reversecausality may be important, in the sense that well-connected people
get invited to more weddings. Second, omitted variables could play a
role. For example, unobserved shocks to the wealth or social status of
the household's relatives may affect both the number of weddings and
the number of family connections with a political ofﬁce. Nevertheless,
the results are consistent with a signiﬁcant share of connections being
formed through marriages. Moreover, the fact that the indicator for
weddings in own household is insigniﬁcant suggests that marriages in
other households aremore important. As discussed, this lessensworries
about endogeneity in regressions for investment and other outcomes.
To investigate the rate of turnover among local ofﬁcials, we conduct-
ed an add-on survey in 12 communes, randomly selected among the
communes in the VARHS survey. One commune was sampled in each
of the 12 provinces in the survey. Information was collected on the
number of ofﬁcials in each commune, the duration of employment of
each ofﬁcial, and the number of ofﬁcials who left a position in the com-
mune during the last two years. Results show that current ofﬁcials have
on average been employed by the commune for 8.5 years. On average,
communes have 17 ofﬁcials and two ofﬁcials left their positions in the
last two years. This suggests a turnover rate of about six percent per
year. Of the ofﬁcials who left their positions about half retired. Two-
thirds of the rest moved to other positions as ofﬁcials. These results
show that there is some turnover among ofﬁcials. This contributes to
generating within-household variation in connections to relatives in
government. On the other hand, ofﬁcials' typical duration of tenure is
long, which implies that connections are potentially effective in terms
of protecting long-term investments in land improvement.
Table 2
Marriages and family connections to public ofﬁcials.
Dependent variable: Household gained connection with relative, who is public ofﬁcial, in last two years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Attended at least 15 weddings 0.488a 0.520a
(2.49) (2.47)
ln(Number of weddings attended + 1) 0.527b 0.510b
(3.83) (3.55)
Hosted wedding in own hh 0.031 −0.071 −0.123 −0.207
(0.13) (0.27) (0.48) (0.73)
Age of head 0.244 0.239
(1.20) (1.18)
Age of head, squared −0.002 −0.002
(1.16) (1.16)
Years of general education of head −0.014 −0.018
(0.28) (0.34)
Female head −0.446 −0.347
(0.52) (0.40)
Number of groups the hh belongs to 0.118 0.097
(1.20) (0.98)
Hh members aged 15–64, log 0.025 −0.049
(0.07) (0.14)
Operated farm land, log 0.008 −0.021
(0.04) (0.11)
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 776 776 692 692
Households 388 388 346 346
Note: Household ﬁxed effects (conditional) logit regressions. Absolute value of z-statistics in brackets. Householdswith ofﬁcials are excluded. Note that only householdswith variation on
the dependent variable are included.
a Signiﬁcant at 5%.
b Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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We now turn to estimating the effect of having relatives in govern-
ment on investment. Table 3 presents estimates of equation (1). To
implement the familiar log-linear version of equation (1) without
dropping observations with zero-values on the dependent variables,
we use ln(I+ 1) as our dependent variable.9
A number of control variables are included.Models 1 and 2 include a
few arguably exogenous characteristics of the household head, namely
age, gender and schooling. For the age variable, we add a squared
term to take account of possible non-monotonous effects. Models 3
and 4 include a larger set of controls. First, Table 2 shows that connec-
tions are related to wedding attendance. Wedding attendance may
proxy for the quality of a household's informal networks more broadly
than simply connections to ofﬁcials. The strength of informal networks
may affect investment through effects on access to credit and insurance.
Therefore, we include ln(Number of weddings attended + 1). As
discussed above, weddings involving household members may affect
investment directly, for example through changes in household labor
supply. Therefore, we include both a dummy for hosting a wedding in
the household and the number of working-age household members
(in logs).
In general, we need to distinguish the effect of connections to of-
ﬁcials from the effect of other types of social capital. We therefore
also include a variable measuring the number of formal groups the
household belongs to. In Vietnam, the most important of these are
the so-called ‘mass organizations’, including the Farmers' Union,
Women's Union, Youth Union, and Veterans' Union. While these or-
ganizations have close links with the state, they do enjoy some de-
gree of independence from local government and membership is
voluntary. Group membership has been used as measure of social9 Following Jacoby andMansuri (2008), we also estimatedmodels with ln(I+ k)− ln(k)
as our dependent variable, where k is a constant. As in Jacoby and Mansuri, we set k to 0.1
times the lowest, strictly positive value of investment observed. Parameter estimates are
somewhat higher in this speciﬁcation but t-statistics are largely unaffected.capital in a number of studies, for example Narayan and Pritchett
(1999) and La Ferrara (2002). Also, the effect of connections to public
ofﬁcials should be distinguished from connections to inﬂuential or
wealthy individuals in general. While government jobs are a key source
of prosperity and status, such success can in present-day Vietnam also
be achieved through a successful career in the private sector. The survey
asks respondents whether they have ‘someone outside the household
they can turn to for money in case of an emergency’. We use an
indicator for having at least one relative who can offer monetary assis-
tance as a measure of family connections to resourceful individuals in
general.
We expect the level of land-related investment to depend on the
amount of land operated by the household. At the same time, house-
holds with large landholdings may ﬁnd it easier to forge connections
with ofﬁcials. Therefore, we control for the amount of agricultural
land operated by the household, in logs. Moreover, year ﬁxed effects
are included to take account of changes over time in the economic envi-
ronment (not shown). Random effects models include province indica-
tors. Finally we reiterate the importance of household ﬁxed effects. A
number of difﬁcult-to-observe household characteristics, such as entre-
preneurial spirit, cognitive abilities and risk preferences are likely to af-
fect both investment decisions and the probability that relatives are
ofﬁcials and therefore may be a source of endogeneity bias. Household
ﬁxed effects account for these factors, to the extent that they are time-
invariant. Fixed effects are included in models 2 and 4, while models 1
and 3 use random effects. Standard errors are clustered by commune,
the primary sampling unit.
All models show a strong and statistically signiﬁcant, positive effect
of family tieswith a public ofﬁcial on land-related investment. The effect
is somewhat smaller in the ﬁxed effects than in the random effects
models, as would be predicted if unobserved, ﬁxed household charac-
teristics affect both investment and connections in the same direction.
Most control variables are insigniﬁcant in the various speciﬁcations.
The main exceptions are farm size and household labor resources,
which have the expected positive effects, although household labor
resources is only signiﬁcant in model 4.
Table 3
Investment and connections to ofﬁcials.
Dependent variable: ln(total investment + 1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative with public ofﬁce 0.588a 0.461b 0.537a 0.477b
(4.09) (2.35) (3.73) (2.23)
Age of head 0.056a −0.013 −0.011 −0.06
(2.59) (0.19) (0.45) (0.86)
Age of head, squared −0.001a 0.000 0.000 0.000
(3.62) (0.01) (0.15) (0.77)
Years of general education of head −0.003 0.03 0.030c 0.045
(0.20) (0.81) (1.87) (1.12)
Female head −0.494a 0.083 −0.034 0.287
(3.97) (0.22) (0.28) (0.71)
Ln(Number of weddings attended + 1) 0.125b 0.024
(2.09) (0.30)
Hosted wedding −0.069 −0.191
(0.74) (1.58)
Number of groups the hh belongs to −0.016 −0.093
(0.14) (0.62)
Relatives who can offer ﬁnancial aid 0.083 0.168
(0.48) (0.76)
Hh members aged 15–64, log 0.052 0.604a
(0.46) (2.89)
Operated farm land, log 0.752a 0.373b
(12.75) (2.55)
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Random of ﬁxed effects (RE or FE)? RE FE RE FE
Observations 5939 5939 5422 5422
Number of households 2187 2187 2057 2057
Note: Linear regressions. Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. Householdswith ofﬁcials are excluded. Random effects models include province indicators. Standard errors clustered at
commune level.
a Signiﬁcant at 1%.
b Signiﬁcant at 5%.
c Signiﬁcant at 10%.
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related investment is our main result. In Table 4, the robustness and in-
terpretation of this result are explored. The dependent variable is total
investment. Fixed household and year effects, and the full set of controls
used in Table 3, are included throughout, so the regressions in Table 4
are all permutations of regression 4 in Table 3.
First, recall that Table 2 showed a signiﬁcant effect of wedding atten-
dance on the probability of gaining a connection with a relative who is
an ofﬁcial. To explore whether connections gained in this way are driv-
ing the effect of connections on investment, the investmentmodel is es-
timated separately for households who attended fewer weddings than
the median household (15) and for those who attended more. The
more weddings a household attended, the higher is the likelihood that
new connections are gained through weddings. Therefore, ifTable 4
Investment and connections to ofﬁcials, robustness tests.
Dependent variable:
ln(total investment + 1)
FE-linear FE-linear
(1) (2)
Relative with public ofﬁce 0.274 0.708a
(0.81) (1.99)
Control variables as in Table 2 Yes Yes
Permutation relative to regression
4 in Table 2
Only hh who attended less
than 15 weddings
Only hh who attended at
least 15 weddings
Observations 2628 2794
Number of households 1476 1501
Note: Absolute value of z-statistics in brackets. Standard errors clustered by commune, except i
no variation on the dependent variable are excluded, which explains the low number of obser
developed in Honoré, 1992 (least squares method used).
a Signiﬁcant at 5%.
b Signiﬁcant at 10%.connections obtained throughweddings are driving investment, the ef-
fect of connections on investment is expected to be stronger among
households who went to many weddings. Models 1 and 2 show that
this is indeed the case. The effect of connections on investment is only
signiﬁcant in the sub-sample with high wedding attendance and the
point estimate is alsomuch higher in this group. This supports that con-
nections gained through weddings are at least partly driving the rela-
tionship between relatives with public ofﬁce and investment.
Second, the investment variable is highly skewed. While the loga-
rithmic transformation goes a long way towards reducing the inﬂuence
of high outliers, it is nevertheless prudent to check the effect of ex-
cluding extremely high observations from the estimation sample.
Regression 3 excludes 26 observations more than three standard
deviations above the mean on the investment measure. Again, theAny investment = 1
FE-linear FE-linear FE-tobit FE-logit
(3) (4) (5) (6)
0.426a 0.883a 0.455b 0.242b
(2.08) (2.37) (1.80) (1.70)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Outliers removed Wage earners removed Tobit model Logit for any investment
5396 2106 5422 3256
2055 1187 2057 1130
n regression 5. Households with ofﬁcials are excluded. In the logit model, households with
vations in regression 6. Regression 5 is a ﬁxed effects tobit model, based on the estimator
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and signiﬁcant.
A third concern is the effect of off-farm activities, in particular wage
labor. Connections may often be generated through work relations, ei-
ther because household members work for the government or because
they are employed privately by government ofﬁcials. At the same time,
wage labormay induce investment, for example because it increases the
opportunity cost of household labor and therefore increases the incen-
tive for investing in labor saving technologies. Again, the reason for
not including measures of wage labor in the preferred speciﬁcation is
potential endogeneity. Regression 4 in Table 3 takes account of this pos-
sibility by including only householdswho reported no labormarket par-
ticipation in any survey year in the estimation sample. The results show
that the coefﬁcient on connections to ofﬁcials remains positive and sig-
niﬁcant. In fact, the point estimate is higher in this model than in the
preferred speciﬁcation. The effect of connections is also robust to includ-
ing an indicator for earning income from wages (results not shown).
Fourth, the investment distribution clearly has a mass-point at zero.
It may therefore be argued that a tobit model is the most preferable es-
timator. Model 5 presents results of using the panel tobit estimator due
to Honoré (1992). The least squares version of themodel is used.Model
6 is a conditional logit model for undertaking any investment. In both
regressions, the effect of relatives in government remains positive and
signiﬁcant.
In sum, the above results support the thesis that family ties to public
ofﬁcials lead to increased levels of land-related investment. In what fol-
lows, we investigate which channels of causation are likely to bring
about these results.
7. Land property rights
A key channel through which connections to ofﬁcials may affect in-
vestment is property rights. Table 5 presents regressions for two differ-
entmeasures of land rights. First, we consider the share of a household's
farm landwhich is heldwith a LURC. LURCs endowholders with a num-
ber of rights, and local ofﬁcials have considerable discretion in the pro-
cess of issuing LURCs. Second, we consider an indicator for having been
expelled from at least one plot of land by the state during the past two
years. This category does not include all transfers of land to the state.
Only cases where households explicitly say that they were ‘expelled’
are included. In all three survey waves, the state was responsible for at
least 93% of the cases where households were expelled from land.
Hence, ‘land grabs’ by private agents are so far rare and government
land expropriation is the main source of tenure insecurity.
The control variables in Table 5 are generally the same as in Table 3.
However, in the regression for share of landwith LURCs, we include the
log of farm land owned, rather than operated. Households do not hold
LURCs for land they rent.10 In the regressions for having lost land to
the state, we include the amount of land owned including the land
which was expropriated. For example, if concerns about equality of
the land ownership distribution play a role in state land expropriation
decisions, then initial land holdings are the relevant factor to consider.
We present results both with a limited set of exogenous characteristics
of the household head, and with a larger set of controls, including land
holdings.
For the share of land held with a LURC, linear regressions are used.
Results are similar if we use logit models for having any land with a
LURC or for having LURCs for more than half the area owned. In the
models for being expelled by the state, we use random effects and con-
ditional (ﬁxed effect) logit models. Results are similar if linear models
for the amount of land expropriated are used instead.
The results show that family ties to ofﬁcials have a positive butmost-
ly insigniﬁcant effect on the share of land held with a LURC. This10 We refer to land to which the household has user rights as ‘owned land’, even if the
land is strictly speaking still owned by People of Vietnam and managed by the state.indicates that even if ofﬁcials demand bribes for issuing certiﬁcates
(Anderson and Davidsen, 2011, World Bank, 2009), there is no strong
tendency to discriminate in favor of family members.
The regressions for being expelled by the state showa stronger effect
of connections. In the random effects model the effect of having a rela-
tive with public ofﬁce is negative but not signiﬁcant. In the ﬁxed effect
models a strong negative effect of family connections to ofﬁcials ap-
pears. The coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level
in model 7 and at the 10 percent level in model 8. Having a relative
with a public ofﬁce is associated with a sizeable drop in the risk of hav-
ing land expropriated. In sum, the ﬁndings indicate that while formal
land rights are not strongly affected by personal connections to public
ofﬁcials, de facto property rights are strengthened by having such ties.
As argued above, this observation supports the view that the corre-
lation between connections and investment reﬂects a causal relation.
For example, an unobserved shock to the wealth of household i's rela-
tives might affect both investment in household i and the probability
that relatives are government ofﬁcials. However, such a shock is argu-
ably unlikely to affect the property rights of household i, except through
the effect of the wealth shock on the chance of having a connection in
government. If connections affect land property rights, it is plausible
that they also affect investment.
8. Credit
Another possible explanation for the investment differential be-
tween well-connected households and others is variation in access to
credit. Local ofﬁcials play an important role in the allocation of loans
from state-run lending institutions. Also, connections to ofﬁcials may
improve access to informal loans, either because farmers can borrow
money directly from ofﬁcials, or because ofﬁcials facilitate connections
to lenders or act as guarantors for loans. If it is well known in the local
community who is connected with whom, and connections with ofﬁ-
cials improve a household's earnings potential, then having a connec-
tion should improve credit-worthiness.
Table 1 reveals that 36% of households had an outstanding formal
loan in 2008 and 15% had an informal loan. Table 6 presents regressions
for currently having a loan with, respectively, formal and informal
lenders. The set of control variables is similar to the set used in
Table 3. Owned farm land is used instead of operated land. Only
owned land can be used as collateral. Again, we present results both
with a limited set of exogenous characteristics of the household head,
and with a larger set of controls.
Random and ﬁxed effects logit models for having a loan are present-
ed. Results are similar if linear models for the amount borrowed are
used (not shown). Focusing ﬁrst on formal loans, the random effects
models show no effect of connections. In the ﬁxed effects model, the ef-
fect of relatives with a public ofﬁce is positive but not signiﬁcant. In the
models for having an informal loan, on the other hand, relatives with
public ofﬁces have a much stronger and statistically signiﬁcant effect
in random as well as in ﬁxed effects models.11 These results suggest
that access to credit, especially from informal lenders, is improved by
connections with government ofﬁcials. This may contribute to ex-
plaining why well-connected households invest more in their land
than other households.
Another interesting result emerging from Table 6 is the strong, pos-
itive effect of groupmembership on use of credit. The likely explanation
is that mass organizations play an important role in screening potential
borrowers. To obtain approval from commune authorities to borrow
from VSPB or VBARD, a letter of recommendation or similar is often
required from the Women's Union, Farmers' Union or another mass
organizations.11 The result that networks are important for access to informal credit mirrors the ﬁnd-
ings in McMillan and Woodruff (1999) who studied the inﬂuence of inter-ﬁrm networks
on Vietnamese ﬁrms' access to credit.
Table 5
Connections and property rights.
Dependent variable:
Share of land with LURC Expelled from land by the state in last two years
RE FE RE FE RE-LOGIT FE-LOGIT RE-LOGIT FE-LOGIT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative with public ofﬁce 0.021a 0.008 0.012 0.014 −0.054 −0.633b −0.195 −0.575a
(1.77) (0.69) (0.98) (1.18) (0.25) (2.30) (0.86) (1.80)
Age of head 0.005 −0.007 0.001 −0.008 0.044 −0.391 −0.047 −0.536a
(1.55) (1.34) (0.33) (1.43) (0.86) (1.34) (0.84) (1.70)
Age of head, squared 0.000 0.0001a 0.000 0.0001a 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.004
(0.20) (1.70) (0.81) (1.79) (0.50) (1.26) (1.20) (1.64)
Years of general education of head 0.014c 0.002 0.008c 0.003 0.114c 0.09 0.063a 0.098
(5.36) (0.67) (3.81) (0.90) (3.87) (1.35) (1.86) (1.38)
Female head 0.042b 0.009 0.007 0.001 0.521b 0.882 0.556b 0.527
(2.16) (0.35) (0.36) (0.05) (2.28) (1.23) (2.24) (0.62)
Number of groups the hh belongs to −0.001 −0.01 0.044 −0.077
(0.18) (1.44) (0.47) (0.46)
Number of weddings attended 0.000 −0.011 −0.128 −0.106
(0.05) (1.16) (0.99) (0.52)
Relatives who can offer ﬁnancial aid −0.003 −0.013 0.003 −0.129
(0.34) (1.11) (0.02) (0.45)
Hosted wedding 0.013 0.011 0.137 −0.011
(0.92) (0.68) (0.49) (0.03)
Hh members aged 15–64, log 0.035b 0.015 0.449a 0.157
(2.39) (0.76) (1.94) (0.36)
Owned farm land, log −0.023c −0.038a
(2.60) (1.89)
Initial farm land owned, log 0.110 1.078c
(1.03) (2.58)
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5885 5885 5549 5549 5936 481 5561 448
Number of household 2177 2177 2080 2080 2186 167 2083 156
Robust z-statistics in brackets. Standard errors clustered by commune, except in regressions 4 and 6. Householdswith ofﬁcials are excluded. Province dummies are included in the random
effects models. In the ﬁxed effects (conditional) logit models, households with no variation on the dependent variable are excluded. This explains the low number of observations in
regressions 6 and 8.
a Signiﬁcant at 10%.
b Signiﬁcant at 5%.
c Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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One reasonwhy connectionswith relatives are not important for ac-
cess to formal creditmay be that relatives inmany cases help each other
through gifts, or transfers, rather than loans. Local government ofﬁcials
control access to a number of public transfers and are better able to af-
ford private transfers than others. Potentially, government ofﬁcials help
their relatives ﬁnance investment through transfers. Also, transfersmay
function as a post-hoc insurance device, in case an investment project
fails. Fafchamps and Lund (2003) show that transfers between relatives
play a key role in mitigating the effects of shocks in the northern
Philippines. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that in 2008,
41% of households report receiving at least one public transfer in the
last year,while 34% report at least one private transfer. 'Always connect-
ed' households are equally likely to receive public transfers as 'never
connected' households, but 11 percentage points more likely to obtain
private transfers.
The regressions in Table 7 analyse the determinants of receiving
public and private transfers in more depth. Again, control variables are
similar to those used in Table 3 and we present results both with a lim-
ited set of exogenous characteristics of the household head, and with a
larger set of controls. The ﬁrst four regressions explore public transfers
and the last four consider private transfers. The results show that family
connections with ofﬁcials have a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
effect on the probability of receiving both kinds of transfers. This is
true in random as well as in ﬁxed effect models. Linear regressions for
the amount of transfer received yield similar results (not shown).Again, this may contribute to explaining the positive effect of relatives
in public ofﬁce on investment.
Results for the control variables are also interesting. All variables
measuring social capital have signiﬁcant, positive effects on receipt of
private transfers in the ﬁxed effects model. Membership of formal
groups also increases the likelihood of receiving public transfers.
Again this probably reﬂects the important role of mass organizations
in terms of screening applicants for public beneﬁts. The ﬁxed effects
regressions show that the presence of relatives, who can offer ﬁnancial
assistance in case of an emergency, increases the likelihood of receiving
public transfers (signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level). Private transfers
mostly beneﬁt households with few working-age members. The ran-
dom effects regressions show that private as well as public transfers
disproportionately go to households with younger household heads,
perhaps reﬂecting the fact that the presence of young children triggers
transfers. The random effects models also show that education of
the household head has a negative effect on receipt of both public and
private transfers.
10. Conclusions
In this study we focused on the political economy of agricultural in-
vestment in rural communities in Vietnam. The core ﬁndings suggest
that family ties to local government ofﬁcials lead households to increase
their levels of land-related investment, for example in perennial crops
and in soil and water conservation. We also found that family connec-
tionswith ofﬁcials strengthen de facto land property rights and improve
Table 7
Connections and monetary transfers.
Dependent variable:
Household receives public transfers Household receives private transfers
RE-LOGIT FE-LOGIT RE-LOGIT FE-LOGIT RE-LOGIT FE-LOGIT RE-LOGIT FE-LOGIT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative with public ofﬁce 0.253a 0.408b 0.225a 0.361a 0.345b 0.421b 0.263b 0.307a
(2.47) (2.93) (2.13) (2.53) (4.73) (3.54) (3.32) (2.41)
Age of head −0.117b −0.098 −0.114b −0.077 −0.011 0.035 −0.045b 0.000
(4.48) (1.40) (4.22) (1.07) (0.69) (0.69) (2.66) (0.00)
Age of head, squared 0.001b 0.001 0.001b 0.001 0.0003a 0.000 0.001b 0.000
(6.21) (1.57) (5.75) (1.16) (2.40) (0.84) (3.81) (0.07)
Years of general education of head −0.067b −0.021 −0.065b −0.027 −0.011 −0.051a −0.023a −0.040
(4.52) (0.76) (4.32) (0.95) (1.22) (2.09) (2.27) (1.46)
Female head 0.246a 0.442 0.264a 0.438 0.232b 0.085 0.03 0.175
(2.03) (1.26) (2.08) (1.22) (3.22) (0.33) (0.37) (0.53)
Number of groups the hh belongs to 0.232b 0.213b 0.043 0.128a
(5.24) (3.48) (1.29) (2.56)
ln(Number of weddings attended + 1) −0.197b −0.021 0.164b 0.234b
(3.44) (0.25) (3.75) (3.04)
Relatives who can offer ﬁnancial aid 0.103 0.217c 0.258b 0.211a
(1.18) (1.89) (3.78) (2.15)
Hosted wedding 0.125 0.116 2.471b 2.343b
(0.89) (0.67) (16.08) (10.89)
Hh members aged 15–64, log 0.088 −0.100 −0.900b −1.421b
(0.79) (0.49) (11.69) (7.99)
Owned farm land, log −0.062 −0.237c −0.035 −0.003
(1.32) (1.90) (1.13) (0.02)
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5935 2485 5625 2339 5935 4018 5625 3771
Number of household 2186 854 2140 810 2186 1389 2140 1360
Robust z-statistics in brackets. Standard errors clustered by commune in FE-logit regressions. Households with ofﬁcials are excluded. Province dummies are included in the random effects
models. In the ﬁxed effects (conditional) logit models, householdswith no variation on the dependent variable are excluded. This explains the low number of observations in these regressions.
a Signiﬁcant at 5%.
b Signiﬁcant at 1%.
c Signiﬁcant at 10%.
Table 6
Connections and use of credit.
Dependent variable:
Household has formal loan Household has informal loan
RE-LOGIT FE-LOGIT RE-LOGIT FE-LOGIT RE-LOGIT FE-LOGIT RE-LOGIT FE-LOGIT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Relative with public ofﬁce 0.082 0.183 −0.002 0.114 0.247a 0.457b 0.209a 0.483b
(0.86) (1.52) (0.02) (0.89) (2.46) (3.41) (2.03) (3.45)
Age of head 0.102b 0.039 0.002 −0.013 0.01 0.041 −0.02 0.026
(4.23) (0.74) (0.10) (0.25) (0.43) (0.61) (0.81) (0.39)
Age of head, squared −0.001b 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.001 0.000 0.000
(5.29) (0.79) (0.77) (0.19) (1.50) (0.90) (0.07) (0.65)
Years of general education of head 0.015 −0.038 0.013 −0.031 −0.046b −0.011 −0.057b −0.022
(1.11) (1.46) (0.93) (1.16) (3.51) (0.31) (4.12) (0.58)
Female head −0.278a −0.277 0.096 −0.068 0.092 −0.041 0.091 −0.092
(2.41) (0.75) (0.81) (0.18) (0.88) (0.10) (0.81) (0.23)
Number of groups the hh belongs to 0.183b 0.057 0.125b 0.124a
(4.50) (0.97) (2.86) (1.98)
Ln(Number of weddings attended + 1) 0.170b 0.146c 0.005 0.027
(3.16) (1.92) (0.08) (0.33)
Relatives who can offer ﬁnancial aid −0.061 0.039 0.380b 0.222c
(0.74) (0.40) (3.98) (1.69)
Hosted wedding −0.011 0.014 0.354b 0.540b
(0.08) (0.09) (2.62) (3.50)
Hh members aged 15–64, log 0.594b 0.511b −0.087 −0.373c
(5.65) (3.00) (0.83) (1.91)
Owned farm land, log 0.208b 0.202c −0.059 −0.044
(4.88) (1.92) (1.38) (0.28)
Year ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5886 2666 5509 2596 5886 1959 5509 1866
Number of household 2185 925 2,080 903 2185 678 2,080 651
Robust z-statistics in brackets. Standard errors clustered by commune in FE-logits. Householdswith ofﬁcials are excluded. Province dummies are included in the random effects models. In
the ﬁxed effects (conditional) logit models, households with no variation on the dependent variable are excluded. This explains the low number of observations in these regressions.
a Signiﬁcant at 5%.
b Signiﬁcant at 1%.
c Signiﬁcant at 10%.
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ﬁndings contribute to explaining the effect of connections on invest-
ment and strengthen the interpretation of the correlation between con-
nections and investment as causal.
Our ﬁndings also indicate that ofﬁcials have a preference for using
informal rather than formal means of redistributing resources to rela-
tives. The most obvious explanation is that ofﬁcials are less likely to be
held accountable by their principals for informal than for formal trans-
actions. The main results hold in models with household ﬁxed effects,
so they are not caused by unobserved, time-invariant household charac-
teristics which drive both investment decisions and the quality of social
networks.
These results underline the economic importance of informal con-
nections, particularly in environments where property rights institu-
tions and markets for credit and insurance are not fully developed.
They also point to the possibility that faster economic development
would be promoted if households without political or bureaucratic
connections could obtain equally strong property rights and access to
ﬁnance and insurance as well-connected households. This would help
increase agricultural investment and in turn stimulate rural economic
growth.
Future research should aim at advancing our understanding of the
motivations behind nepotistic behavior of local government ofﬁcials.
As discussed in Section 1, such behavior may either be driven by a
‘taste for discrimination’ or by the need to solve an agency problem.
For two reasons, we believe that the effects of family ties to public ofﬁ-
cials identiﬁed here are at least partly based on a ‘taste for discrimina-
tion’ among ofﬁcials. First, it is difﬁcult to explain the effect of
connections on land expropriation as a response to an agency problem
(there is no principal–agent relation between the government and the
land holder). Second, the apparent preference of ofﬁcials for using infor-
mal over formal means of transferring beneﬁts to relatives is consistent
with the view that ofﬁcials prefer to hide these transfers, which in turn
indicates that they are notmotivated by benevolent concerns. To the ex-
tent that nepotism is indeed driven by a taste for discrimination, mea-
sures to increase the accountability of local governments in Vietnam
are called for. Stronger accountability would increase the probability
that ofﬁcials with strong, nepotistic preferences are replaced and
therefore also force down ofﬁcials' (derived) preference for
discrimination.
The literature on land reform in Vietnam has tended to converge on
a largely positive assessment of the effects of reformand the role of local
government in implementing it. We do not dispute these ﬁndings. At
the same time, our results do indicate that elite capture and nepotism
play important roles in the present day political economy of land rela-
tions in Vietnam. Is it possible to reconcile our ﬁndings with, for exam-
ple, Ravallion and van de Walle's conclusion that the process of de-
collectivization was largely unaffected by corruption (Ravallion and
van deWalle, 2004)? One way is to view the period of rapid and radical
reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s as an exceptional epoch, where
the zeal of local ofﬁcials and monitoring by the central government
were unusually intense. Arguably, our data were collected in more
‘normal’ times.References
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